Magniber Ransomware
Magniber Ransomware Wants to Infect Only the Right People
Exploit kit (EK) utilize has been
on the decay since late 2016; in any case, certain action stays steady. The
Magnitude Exploit Kit is one such case that keeps on influencing clients,
especially in the APAC locale.
In Figure 1, which depends on
FireEye Dynamic danger Intelligence (DTI) reports partook in March 2017, we can
see the locales influenced by Magnitude EK action amid the most recent three
months of 2016 and the initial three months of 2017.
This pattern proceeded until late
September 2017, when we saw Magnitude EK concentrate basically on the APAC
district, with an extensive lump focusing on South Korea. Extent EK action at
that point tumbled off the radar until Oct. 15, 2017, when it returned and
started concentrating exclusively on South Korea. Already it had been conveying
Cerber ransomware, however Cerber circulation has declined (we have
additionally observed a decrease of Cerber being appropriated by means of
email) and now it is dispersing ransomware known as Magniber.
Infection
The main return of Magnitude EK
on Oct. 15 came as a malvertising redirection from the area: fastprofit[.]loan.
The contamination chain is appeared in the following figure.
Infection chain |
The Magnitude EK presentation page comprised of CVE-2016-0189, which was first revealed by FireEye as being utilized as a part of Neutrino Exploit Kit after it was fixed. Figure 3 demonstrates the point of arrival and CVE use.
Magnitude EK landing page |
As observed beforehand with Magnitude EK, the payload is downloaded as a plain EXE (see following figure) and space foundation is facilitated on the accompanying server:
"Apache/2.2.15 (CentOS) DAV/2 mod_fastcgi/2.4.6"
Magnitude payload header and plain MZ response |
Payload
In the underlying report distributed
by our partners at Trend Micro, the ransomware being appropriated is alluded to
as Magniber. These ransomware payloads just appear to target Korean frameworks,
since they won't execute if the framework dialect isn't Korean.
Magniber scrambles client
information utilizing the AES128. The specimen utilized
(dc2a2b84da359881b9df1ec31d03c715) for this examination was pulled from our DTI
framework when the crusade was dynamic. Of note, this specimen varies from the
hash shared publically by Trend Micro, however the two display a similar
conduct and offer the disease vector, and both were appropriated around a
similar time.
The malware contains a twofold
payload in its asset segment encoded backward utilizing RC4. It begins
unloading it from the finish of the cushion to its begin. Turn around RC4
decoding keys are 30 bytes in length and furthermore contain non-ASCII
characters. They are as per the following:
dc2a2b84da359881b9df1ec31d03c715
RC4 key:
{ 0x6b, 0xfe, 0xc4, 0x23, 0xac,
0x50, 0xd7, 0x91, 0xac, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xa6, 0x65, 0x89, 0x6a, 0xcc, 0x05, 0xba,
0xd7, 0x83, 0x04, 0x90, 0x2a, 0x93, 0x8d, 0x2d, 0x5c, 0xc7, 0xf7, 0x3f }
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